Abstract. We present a hybrid synthesis method for automatic addition of fault-tolerance to distributed programs. In particular, we automatically specify and add pre-synthesized fault-tolerance components to programs in the cases where existing heuristics fail to add fault-tolerance. Such addition of pre-synthesized components has the advantage of reusing pre-synthesized fault-tolerance components in the synthesis of different programs, and as a result, reusing the effort put in the synthesis of one program for the synthesis of another program. Our synthesis method is sound in that the synthesized fault-tolerant program satisfies its specification in the absence of faults, and provides desired level of faulttolerance in the presence of faults. We illustrate our synthesis method by adding pre-synthesized components with linear topology to a token ring program that tolerates the corruption of all processes. Also, we have reused the same component in the synthesis of a fault-tolerant alternating bit protocol. Elsewhere, we have applied this method for adding presynthesized components with hierarchical topology.
Introduction
Automatic synthesis of fault-tolerant distributed programs from their faultintolerant versions is desirable in variety of disciplines (e.g., safety-critical systems, embedded systems, network protocols) since such automated synthesis (i) generates a program that is correct by construction, and (ii) has the potential to preserve the properties of the fault-intolerant program. However, the exponential complexity of synthesis is one of the important obstacles in such automated synthesis. Thus, it is desirable to reuse the effort put in the synthesis of one program for the synthesis of another program. In this paper, we concentrate on the identification and the addition of pre-synthesized fault-tolerance components to fault-intolerant programs so that we can reuse those components in the synthesis of different programs.
In the previous work on automatic transformation of fault-intolerant programs to fault-tolerant programs, Kulkarni and Arora [1] present polynomial time algorithms (in the state space of the fault-intolerant program) for the synthesis of fault-tolerant programs in the high atomicity model -where each process of the program can read/write all program variables in an atomic step. However, for the synthesis of fault-tolerant distributed programs, they show that the complexity of synthesis is exponential. Techniques presented in [2] [3] [4] reduce the complexity of synthesis by using heuristics and by identifying classes of programs and specifications for which efficient synthesis is possible. However, these approaches cannot apply the lessons learnt in synthesizing one fault-tolerant program while synthesizing another fault-tolerant program. As we encounter new problems, it is desirable to reuse synthesis techniques that we have already used during the synthesis of other problems. Hence, if we recognize the patterns that we often apply in the synthesis of fault-tolerant distributed programs then we can organize those patterns in terms of fault-tolerance components and reuse them in the synthesis of new problems.
To investigate the use of pre-synthesized fault-tolerance components in the synthesis of fault-tolerant distributed programs, we use detectors and correctors identified in [5] . Specifically, in [5] , it is shown that detectors and correctors suffice in the manual design of a rich class of masking fault-tolerant programs -where the fault-tolerant program satisfies its safety and liveness specification even in the presence of faults. To achieve our goal, we present a synthesis method that adds pre-synthesized detectors and correctors to a given fault-intolerant program in order to synthesize its fault-tolerant version. Using our synthesis method, we identify (i) the representation of the pre-synthesized detectors and correctors; (ii) when and where the synthesis algorithm should use a detector or a corrector, and (iii) how to ensure the correctness of the fault-tolerant program and pre-synthesized detectors and correctors in the presence of each other. Contributions. The contributions of this paper are as follows: (i) we develop a synthesis method for reusing pre-synthesized fault-tolerance components in the synthesis of different programs; (ii) we reduce the chance of failure of the synthesis algorithm by using pre-synthesized fault-tolerance components in the cases where existing heuristics fail; (iii) we present a systematic approach for expanding the state space of the program being synthesized in the cases where synthesis fails in the original state space, and finally (iv) we present a systematic method for adding new variables to programs for the sake of adding fault-tolerance.
As an illustration of our synthesis method, we add pre-synthesized components with linear topology to a token ring program that is subject to processrestart faults. The masking fault-tolerant (token ring) program can recover even from the situation where every process is corrupted. We note that the previous approaches that added fault-tolerance to the token ring program presented in this paper fail to synthesize a fault-tolerant program when all processes are corrupted. We have also synthesized a fault-tolerant alternating bit protocol by reusing the same pre-synthesized fault-tolerance component used in the synthesis of the token ring program (cf. [6] for this synthesis). Elsewhere [7] , we have used this method for synthesizing a fault-tolerant diffusing computation where the added component is hierarchical in nature. This example also demonstrates the addition of multiple components. Thus, the synthesis method presented in this paper can be used for adding fault-tolerance components (i) on different topologies, and (ii) for different types of faults.
Note. The notion of program in this paper refers to the abstract structure of a program. The abstract structure of a program is an abstraction of the parts of the program code that execute inter-process synchronization tasks. The organization of the paper. In Section 2, we present preliminary concepts. In Section 3, we formally state the problem of adding fault-tolerance components to fault-intolerant programs. Then, in Section 4, we present a synthesis method that identifies when and how the synthesis algorithm decides to add a component. Subsequently, in Section 5, we describe how we formally represent a fault-tolerance component. In Section 6, we show how we automatically specify a required component and add it to a program. We discuss issues related to our synthesis method in Section 7. Finally, we make concluding remarks and discuss future work in Section 8.
Preliminaries
In this section, we give formal definitions of programs, problem specifications, faults, and fault-tolerance. The programs are specified in terms of their state space and their transitions. We have adapted the definition of (i) specifications from Alpern and Schneider [8] , and (ii) faults and fault-tolerance from Arora and Gouda [9] and Kulkarni and Arora [10] . The issues of modeling distributed programs is adapted from [1, 11] . Program. A program p is a finite set of variables and a finite set of processes. Each variable is associated with a finite domain of values. A state of p is obtained by assigning each variable a value from its respective domain. The state space of p, S p , is the set of all possible states of p.
A process, say P j , in p is associated with a set of program variables, say r j , that P j can read and a set of variables, say w j , that P j can write. Also, process P j consists of a set of transitions of the form (s 0 , s 1 ) where s 0 , s 1 ∈ S p . The set of the transitions of p is the union of the transitions of its processes.
A state predicate of p is any subset of S p . A state predicate S is closed in the program p iff (if and only if) ∀s 0 , s 1 : (s 0 , s 1 ) ∈ p : (s 0 ∈ S ⇒ s 1 ∈ S). A sequence of states, s 0 , s 1 , ... , is a computation of p iff the following two conditions are satisfied: (1) ∀j : j > 0 : (s j−1 , s j ) ∈ p, and (2) if s 0 , s 1 , ... is finite and terminates in state s l then there does not exist state s such that (s l , s) ∈ p. A sequence of states, s 0 , s 1 , ..., s n , is a computation prefix of p iff ∀j : 0 < j ≤ n : (s j−1 , s j ) ∈ p , i.e., a computation prefix need not be maximal. The projection of program p on state predicate S, denoted as p|S, consists of transitions {(s 0 , s 1 ) : (s 0 , s 1 ) ∈ p ∧ s 0 , s 1 ∈ S}. Distribution issues. We model distribution by identifying how read/write restrictions on a process affect its transitions. A process P j cannot include transi-tions that write a variable x, where x / ∈ w j . In other words, the write restrictions identify the set of transitions that a process P j can execute. Given a single transition (s 0 , s 1 ), it appears that all the variables must be read to execute that transition. For this reason, read restrictions require us to group transitions and ensure that the entire group is included or the entire group is excluded. As an example, consider a program consisting of two variables a and b, with domains {0, 1}. Suppose that we have a process that cannot read b. Now, observe that the transition from the state a = 0, b = 0 to a = 1, b = 0 can be included iff the transition from a = 0, b = 1 to a = 1, b = 1 is also included. If we were to include only one of these transitions, we would need to read both a and b. However, when these two transitions are grouped, the value of b is irrelevant, and we do not need read it. Specification. A specification is a set of infinite sequences of states that is suffix closed and fusion closed. Suffix closure of the set means that if a state sequence σ is in that set then so are all the suffixes of σ. Fusion closure of the set means that if state sequences α, s, γ and β, s, δ are in that set then so are the state sequences α, s, δ and β, s, γ , where α and β are finite prefixes of state sequences, γ and δ are suffixes of state sequences, and s is a program state.
Following Alpern and Schneider [8] , we rewrite the specification as the intersection of a safety specification and a liveness specification. For a suffix-closed and fusion-closed specification, the safety specification can be specified [10] as a set of bad transitions that must not occur in program computations, that is, for program p, its safety specification is a subset of S p × S p .
Given a program p, a state predicate S, and a specification spec, we say that p satisfies spec from S iff (1) S is closed in p, and (2) every computation of p that starts in a state in S is in spec. If p satisfies spec from S and S = {}, we say that S is an invariant of p for spec.
We do not explicitly specify the liveness specification in our algorithm; the liveness requirements for the synthesis is that the fault-tolerant program eventually recovers to states from where it satisfies its safety and liveness specification. Faults. The faults that a program is subject to are systematically represented by transitions. A fault f for a program p with state space S p , is a subset of the set S p × S p . A sequence of states, σ = s 0 , s 1 , ... , is a computation of p in the presence of f (denoted p[]f ) iff the following three conditions are satisfied: (1) every transition t ∈ σ is a fault or program transition; (2) if σ is finite and terminates in s l then there exists no program transition originating at s l , and (3) the number of fault occurrences in σ is finite.
We say that a state predicate T is an f -span (read as fault-span) of p from S iff the following two conditions are satisfied: (1) S ⇒ T and (2) T is closed in p[]f . Observe that for all computations of p that start at states where S is true, T is a boundary in the state space of p up to which (but not beyond which) the state of p may be perturbed by the occurrence of the transitions in f . Fault-tolerance. Given a program p, its invariant, S, its specification, spec, and a class of faults, f , we say p is masking f -tolerant for spec from S iff the following two conditions hold: (i) p satisfies spec from S; (ii) there exists a state predicate T such that T is an f -span of p from S, p[]f satisfies spec from T , and every computation of p[]f that starts from a state in T has a state in S. Program representation. We use Dijkstra's guarded commands [12] to represent the set of program transitions. A guarded command (action) is of the form grd → st, where grd is a state predicate and st is a statement that updates the program variables. The guarded command grd → st includes all program transitions {(s 0 , s 1 ) : grd holds at s 0 and the atomic execution of st at s 0 takes the program to state s 1 }.
Problem Statement
In this section, we formally define the problem of adding fault-tolerance components to a fault-intolerant program. We identify the conditions of the addition problem by which we can verify the correctness of the synthesized fault-tolerant program after adding fault-tolerance components.
Given a fault-intolerant program p, its state space S p , its invariant S, its specification spec, and a class of faults f , we add pre-synthesized fault-tolerance components to p in order to synthesize a fault-tolerant program p with the new invariant S . When we add a fault-tolerance component to p, we also add the variables associated with that component. As a result, we expand the state space of p. The new state space, say S p , is actually the state space of the synthesized fault-tolerant program p .
After the addition, we require the fault-tolerant program p to behave similar to p in the absence of faults f . In the presence of faults f , p should satisfy masking fault-tolerance. To ensure the correctness of the synthesized fault-tolerant program in the new state space, we need to identify the conditions that have to be met by the synthesized program, p . Towards this end, we define a projection from S p to S p using onto function H : S p → S p . We apply H on states, state predicates, transitions, and groups of transitions in S p to identify their corresponding entities in S p .
Let the invariant of the synthesized program be S ⊆ S p . If there exists a state s 0 ∈ S where H(s 0 ) / ∈ S then in the absence of faults p can start at s 0 whose image, H(s 0 ), is outside S. As a result, in the absence of faults, p will include computations in the new state space S p that do not have corresponding computations in p. These new computations resemble new behaviors in the absence of faults, which is not desirable. Therefore, we require that H(S ) ⊆ S. Also, if p contains a transition (s 0 , s 1 ) in p |S that does not have a corresponding transition (s 0 , s 1 ) in p|H(S ) (where H(s 0 ) = s 0 and H(s 1 ) = s 1 ) then p can take this transition and create a new way for satisfying spec in the absence of faults. Therefore, we require that H(p |S ) ⊆ p|H(S ). Now, we present the problem of adding fault-tolerance components to p.
The Addition Problem. Given p, S, spec, f , with state space S p such that p satisfies spec from S, S p is the new state space due to adding fault-tolerance components to p, H : S p → S p is an onto function, Identify p and S ⊆ S p such that
, and p is masking f -tolerant for spec from S .
The Synthesis Method
In this section, we present a synthesis method to solve the addition problem. In Section 4.1, we present a high level description of our synthesis method and express our approach for combining heuristics from [2] (cf. Section 4.2 for an example heuristic) with pre-synthesized components. Then, in Section 4.2, we illustrate our synthesis method using a simple example, a token ring program with 4 processes. We use the token ring program as a running example in the rest of the paper, where we synthesize a token ring program that is masking fault-tolerant to process-restart faults.
Overview of Synthesis Method
Our synthesis method takes as its input a fault-intolerant program p with a set of processes P 0 · · · P n (n > 1), its specification spec, its invariant S, a set of read/write restrictions r 0 · · · r n and w 0 · · · w n , and a class of faults f to which we intend to add fault-tolerance. The synthesis method outputs a fault-tolerant program p and its invariant S . The heuristics in [2] (i) add safety to ensure that the masking fault-tolerant program never violates its safety specification, and (ii) add recovery to ensure that the masking fault-tolerant program never deadlocks (respectively, livelocks). Moreover, while adding recovery transitions, it is necessary to ensure that all the groups of transitions included along that recovery transition are safe unless it can be guaranteed (with the help from heuristics) that those transitions cannot be executed. Thus, adding recovery transitions from deadlock states is one of the important issues in adding fault-tolerance. Hence, the method presented in this paper, focuses on adding pre-synthesized components for resolving such deadlock states, say s d . Now, in order to resolve s d using our hybrid approach, we proceed as follows: First, for each process P i in the given fault-intolerant program, we introduce a high atomicity pseudo process P S i . Initially, P S i has no action to execute, however, we allow P S i to read all program variables and write only those variables that P i can write. Using these special processes, we present the ResolveDeadlock routine (cf. Figure 1 ) that is the core of our synthesis method. The input of ResolveDeadlock consists of the deadlock state that needs to be resolved, s d , and the set of high atomicity pseudo processes
First, in Step 1, we invoke a heuristic-based routine Add Recovery to add recovery from s d under the distribution restrictions (i.e., in the low atomicity model) -where program processes have read/write restrictions with respect to the program variables. Add Recovery explores the ability of each process P i to add recovery transition from s d under the distribution restrictions. If Add Recovery fails then we will choose to add a fault-tolerance component in Steps 2 and 3.
In Steps 2 and 3, we identify a fault-tolerance component and then add it to p in order to resolve s d . To add a fault-tolerance component, the synthesis algorithm should (i) specify the required component; (ii) retrieve the specified component from a given library of components; (iii) ensure the interference freedom of the component and the program, and finally (iv) add the extracted component to the program. As a result, adding a pre-synthesized component is a costly operation. Hence, we prefer to add a component during the synthesis only when available heuristics for adding recovery fail in Step 1.
Resolve Deadlock(s d : state, P S 0 , · · · , P S n : high atomicity pseudo process) {
Step 1. If Add Recovery (s d ) then return true.
Step 2. Else non-deterministically choose a P S index , where 0 ≤ index ≤ n and P S index adds a high atomicity recovery action grd → st To identify the required fault-tolerance components, we use pseudo process P S i that can read all program variables and write w i (i.e., the set of variables that P i can write). In other words, we check the ability of each P S i to add high atomicity recovery -where we have no read restrictions -from s d . If no P S i can add recovery from s d then our algorithm fails to resolve s d . If there exist one or more pseudo processes that add recovery from s d then we non-deterministically choose a process P S index with high atomicity action ac : grd → st. Since we give P S index the permission to read all program variables for adding recovery from s d , the guard grd is a global state predicate that we need to refine. If there exists a detector that can refine grd without interfering with the program execution then we will add that detector to the program. (The discussion about how to specify the required detector d and how to add d to the fault-intolerant program is in Sections 5 and 6.)
In cases where Resolve Deadlock returns false, we remove some transitions to make s d unreachable. If we fail to make s d unreachable then we will declare failure in the synthesis of the masking fault-tolerant program p . Observe that by using pre-synthesized components, we increase the chance of adding recovery from s d , and as a result, we reduce the chance of reaching a point where we declare failure to synthesize a fault-tolerant program.
Token Ring Example
Using our synthesis method (cf. Figure 1 ), we synthesize a token ring program that is masking fault-tolerant for the case where all processes are corrupted. The token ring program. The fault-intolerant program consists of four processes P 0 , P 1 , P 2 , and P 3 arranged in a ring. Each process P i has a variable x i (0 ≤ i ≤ 3) with the domain {⊥, 0, 1}. Due to distribution restrictions, process P i can read x i and x i−1 and can only write x i (1 ≤ i ≤ 3). P 0 can read x 0 and x 3 and can only write x 0 . We say, a process P i (1 ≤ i ≤ 3) has the token iff x i = x i−1 and fault transitions have not corrupted P i and P i−1 . And, P 0 has the token iff x 3 = x 0 and fault transitions have not corrupted P 0 and P 3 . A process P i (1 ≤ i ≤ 3) copies x i−1 to x i if the value of x i is different from x i−1 . Also, if x 0 = x 3 then process P 0 copies the value of (x 3 ⊕ 1) to x 0 , where ⊕ is addition in modulo 2. This way, a process passes the token to the next process.
We denote a state s of the token ring program by a 4-tuple x 0 , x 1 , x 2 , x 3 . Each element of the 4-tuple x 0 , x 1 , x 2 , x 3 represents the value of x i in s (0 ≤ i ≤ 3). Thus, if we start from initial state 0, 0, 0, 0 then process P 0 has the token and the token circulates along the ring. We represent the transitions of the fault-intolerant program T R by the following actions (1 ≤ i ≤ 3).
Faults. Faults can restart a process P i . Thus, the value of x i becomes unknown.
We use ⊥ to model the unknown value of x i . Specification. The problem specification requires that the corrupted value of one process does not affect a non-corrupted process, and there is only one process that has the token. 1, 0, 0 , 1, 1, 1, 0 , 1, 1, 1, 1 , 0, 1, 1, 1 , 0, 0, 1, 1 , and 0, 0, 0, 1 . A heuristic for adding recovery. In the presence of faults, the program T R may reach states where there exists at least a process P i (0 ≤ i ≤ 3) whose x i is corrupted (i.e., x i = ⊥). In such cases, processes P i and P ((i+1) mod 4) cannot take any transition, and as a result, the propagation of the token stops (i.e., the whole program deadlocks).
In order to recover from the states where there exist some corrupted processes, we apply the heuristic for single-step recovery from [2] in an iterative fashion. Specifically, we identify states from where single-step recovery to a set of states RecoverySet is possible. The initial value of RecoverySet is equal to the program invariant. At each iteration, we include a set of states in RecoverySet from where single-step recovery to RecoverySet is possible.
In the first iteration, we search for deadlock states where there is only one corrupted process in the ring. For example, consider a state s 0 = 1, ⊥, 1, 0 . In the state s 0 , P 1 and P 2 cannot take any transitions. However, P 3 can copy the value of x 2 and reach s 2 = 1, ⊥, 1, 1 . Subsequently, P 0 changes x 0 to 0, and as a result, the program reaches state s 3 = 0, ⊥, 1, 1 . The state s 3 is a deadlock state since no process can take any transition at s 3 . To add recovery from s 3 , we allow P 1 to correct itself by copying the value of x 0 , which is equal to 0. Thus, by copying the value of x 0 , P 1 adds a recovery transition to an invariant state 0, 0, 1, 1 . Therefore, we include s 3 in the set of states RecoverySet in the first iteration. Note that this recovery transition is added in low atomicity in that all the transitions included in action (x 0 = 0) ∧ (x 1 = ⊥) → x 1 := 0 can be included in the fault-tolerant program without violating safety.
In the second and third iterations, we follow the same approach and add recovery from states where there are two or three corrupted processes to states Using above heuristic, we can only add recovery from the states where there exists at least one uncorrupted process. If there exists at least one uncorrupted process P j (0 ≤ j ≤ 3) then P ((j+1) mod 4) will initiate the token circulation throughout the ring, and as a result, the program recovers to its invariant. However, in the fourth iteration of the above heuristic, we reach a point where we need to add recovery from the state where all processes are corrupted; i.e., s d = ⊥, ⊥, ⊥, ⊥ . In such a state, the program IT R deadlocks as an action of the form (x 0 = ⊥) ∧ (x 1 = ⊥) → x 1 := 0 cannot be included in the fault-tolerant program. Such an action can violate safety if x 2 and x 3 are not corrupted. In fact, no process can add safe recovery from s d in low atomicity. Thus, Add Recovery returns false for ⊥, ⊥, ⊥, ⊥ . Adding the actions of the high atomicity pseudo process. In order to add masking fault-tolerance to the program IT R, a process P index (0 ≤ index ≤ 3) should set its x value to 0 (respectively, 1) when all processes are corrupted. Hence, we follow our synthesis method (cf. Figure 1) , where the pseudo process P S 0 takes the high atomicity action HT R and recovers from s d . Thus, the actions of the masking program M T R are as follows (1 ≤ i ≤ 3).
In order to refine the high atomicity action HT R, we need to add a detector that detects the state predicate (
In Section 5, we describe the specification of fault-tolerance components, and we show how we use a distributed detector to refine high atomicity actions. Remark. Had we non-deterministically chosen to use P S i (i = 0) as the process that adds the high atomicity recovery action then the high atomicity action HT R would have been different in that HT R would write x i . (We refer the reader to [13] for a discussion about this issue.)
Specifying Pre-Synthesized Components
In this section, we describe the specification of fault-tolerance components (i.e., detectors and correctors). Specifically, we concentrate on detectors and we consider a special subclass of correctors where a corrector consists of a detector and a write action on the local variables of a single process.
The Specification of Detectors
We recall the specification of a detector component presented in [10, 14] . Towards this end, we describe detection predicates, and witness predicates. A detector, say d, identifies whether or not a global state predicate, X, holds. The global state predicate X is called a detection predicate in the global state space of a distributed program [10, 14] .
It is often difficult to evaluate the truth value of X in an atomic action. Thus, we (i) decompose the detection predicate X into a set of smaller detection predicates X 0 · · · X n where the compositional detection of X 0 · · · X n leads us to the detection of X, and (ii) provide a state predicate, say Z, whose value leads the detector to the conclusion that X holds. Since when Z becomes true its value witnesses that X is true, we call Z a witness predicate. If Z holds then X will have to hold as well. If X holds then Z will eventually hold and continuously remain true. Hence, corresponding to each detection predicate X i , we identify a witness predicate Z i such that if Z i is true then X i will be true.
The detection predicate X is either the conjunction of X i (0 ≤ i ≤ n) or the disjunction of X i . Since the detection predicates that we encounter represent deadlock states, they are inherently in conjunctive form where each conjunct represents the valuation to program variables at some process. Hence, in the rest of the paper, we consider the case where X is a conjunction of X i , for 0 ≤ i ≤ n. Specification. Let X and Z be state predicates. Let 'Z detects X' be the problem specification. Then, 'Z detects X' stipulates that -(Safety) When Z holds, X must hold as well.
-(Liveness) When the predicate X holds and continuously remains true, Z will eventually hold and continuously remain true.
We represent the safety specification of a detector as a set of transitions that a detector is not allowed to take. Thus, the following set of transitions represents the safety specification of a detector.
The predicate Z(s 1 ) denotes the truth value of Z at state s 1 .
The Representation of Detectors
In this section, we describe how we formally represent a distributed detector. While our method allows one to use detectors of different topologies (cf. Section 6.1), in this section, we comprehensively describe the representation of a linear (sequential) detector as such a detector will be used in our token ring example. The composition of detectors. A detector, say d, with the detection predicate X ≡ X 0 ∧ . . . ∧ X n is obtained by composing d i , 0 ≤ i ≤ n, where d i is responsible for the detection of X i using a witness predicate Z i (0 ≤ i ≤ n). The elements of d can execute in parallel or in sequence. More specifically, parallel detection of X requires d 0 · · · d n to execute concurrently. As a result, the state predicate (Z 0 ∧ · · · ∧ Z n ) is the witness predicate for detecting X.
A sequential detector requires the detectors d 0 · · · d n to execute one after another. For example, given a linear arrangement d n · · · d 0 , a detector d i (0 ≤ i < n) detects its detection predicate, using Z i , after d i+1 witnesses. Thus, when Z i becomes true, it shows that Z i+1 already holds. Since when Z i becomes true X i must be also true, it follows that the detection predicates X n · · · X i hold. Therefore, we can atomically check the witness predicate Z 0 in order to identify whether or not X ≡ (X n ∧ · · · ∧ X 0 ) holds.
The detection of global state predicates of programs that have a hierarchical topology (e.g., tree-like structures) requires parallel and sequential detectors. For brevity, we demonstrate our method in the context of a linear detector. As such a detector suffices for the example considered in this paper, we refer the reader to [7] for an illustration of this method for hierarchical components. A linear detector. We consider a detector d with linear topology. The detector d consists of n + 1 elements (n > 0), its specification spec d , its variables, and its invariant U . Since the structure of the detector is linear, without loss of generality, we consider an arrangement d n · · · d 0 for the elements of the distributed detector, where the left-most element is d n and the right-most element is d 0 . Component variables. Each element d i , 0 ≤ i ≤ n, of the detector has a Boolean variable y i . Read/write restrictions. Element d i can read y i and y i+1 , and can only write y i (0 ≤ i < n). d n reads and writes y n . Also, d i is allowed to read r i ; i.e., the set of variables that are readable for a process P i with which d i is composed. Using action DA i (0 ≤ i < n), each element d i of the linear detector witnesses (i.e., sets the value of y i to true) whenever (i) the condition LC i becomes true, where LC i represents a local condition that d i atomically checks (by reading the variables of P i ), and (ii) its neighbor d i+1 has already witnessed. The detector d n witnesses (using action DA n ) when LC n becomes true. Detection predicates. The detection predicate X i for element d i is equal to (LC n ∧ · · · ∧ LC i ) (0 ≤ i ≤ n). Therefore, d 0 detects the global detection predicate LC n ∧ · · · ∧ LC 0 . Invariant. During the detection, when an element d i sets y i to true, the elements d j , for i < j ≤ n, have already set their y values to true. Hence, we represent the invariant of the linear detector by the predicate U , where
We model the fault transitions that affect the linear detector using the following action (cf. Section 7 for a discussion about the way that we have modeled the faults). 
Token Ring Example Continued
In Section 4.2, we added the following high atomicity action to the token ring program IT R that is executed by the pseudo process P S 0 .
In order to synthesize a distributed program (that includes low atomicity actions), we need to refine the guard of the above action. The read/write restrictions of the processes in the token ring program identify the underlying communication topology of the fault-intolerant program, which is a ring. Hence, we select a linear detector, d, so that we can organize its elements,
Each detector d i is responsible to detect whether or not the local conditions LC 3 to LC i hold (LC i ≡ (x i = ⊥)), for 0 ≤ i ≤ 3. Thus, the detection predicate X i is equal to ((x 3 = ⊥)∧· · ·∧(x i = ⊥)), for 0 ≤ i ≤ 3. As a result, the global detection predicate of the linear detector is ((
The witness predicate of each d i , say Z i , is equal to (y i = true), and the actions of the sequential detector are as follows (0 ≤ i ≤ 2).
Note that we replace (LC i ) with (x i = ⊥) in the above actions. During the synthesis, after the synthesis algorithm acquires the actions of its required component, it replaces each (LC i ) with the appropriate condition in order to create the transition groups corresponding to each action of the component.
Using Pre-Synthesized Components
In this section, we describe how we perform the second and the third step of our synthesis method presented in Figure 1 . In particular, in Section 6.1, we show how we automatically specify the required components during the synthesis. Then, in Section 6.3, we show how we ensure that no interference exists between the program and the fault-tolerance component. Afterwards, we present an algorithm for the addition of fault-tolerance components. In Sections 6.2 and 6.4, we respectively present the algorithmic specification and the algorithmic addition of a linear detector to the token ring program.
Algorithmic Specification of the Fault-Tolerance Components
We present the Component Specification algorithm (cf. Figure 2 ) that takes a deadlock state s d , the distribution restrictions (i.e., the read/write restrictions) of the program being synthesized, and the set of high atomicity pseudo processes P S i (0 ≤ i ≤ n). First, the algorithm searches for a high atomicity process P S index that is able to add a high atomicity recovery action, ac : grd → st, from s d to a state in the state predicate S rec , where S rec represents the set of states from where there exists a safe recovery path to the invariant. Also, we verify the closure of S rec ∪ s d in the computations of p[]f . If there exists such a process P S index then the algorithm returns a triple X, R, index , where (i) X is the detection predicate that should be refined in the refinement of the action ac; (ii) R is a relation that represents the topology of the program, and (iii) the index is an integer that identifies the process that should detect grd and execute st.
The Component Specification algorithm constructs the state predicate X using the LC i conditions. Each LC i condition is by itself a conjunction that consists of the program variables readable for process P i . Therefore, the predicate X will be the conjunction of LC i conditions (0 ≤ i ≤ n).
The relation R ⊆ (P × P ) identifies the communication topology of the distributed program, where P is the set of program processes. We represent R by a finite set { i, j : (0 ≤ i ≤ n) ∧ (0 ≤ j ≤ n) : w i ⊆ r j } that we create using the read/write restrictions among the processes. The presence of a pair i, j in R shows that there exists a communication link between P i and P j . Since we internally represent R by an undirected graph, we consider the pair i, j as an unordered pair. The interface of the fault-tolerance components. The format of the interface of each component is the same as the output of the Component Specification algorithm, which is a triple X, R, index as described above. We use this interface to extract a component from the component library using a patternmatching algorithm. Towards this end, we use existing specification-matching techniques [15] . For reasons of space, we omit the details of the component extraction from the library of components.
Component Specification(s d : state, S rec : state predicate, P S 0 , · · · , P S n : high atomicity pseudo process, spec: safety specification, r 0 , · · · , r n : read restrictions, w 0 , · · · , w n : write restrictions) { // n is the number of processes.
if
return X, R, index; else return f alse, ∅, -1; } Fig. 2 . Automatic specification of a component.
The output of the component library. Given the interface X, R, index of a required component, the component library returns the witness predicate, Z, the invariant, U , and the set of transition groups, gd 0 ∪ · · · ∪ gd k ∪ g index , of the pre-synthesized component (k ≥ 0). The group of transitions g index represents the low atomicity write action that should be executed by process P index . Complexity. Since the algorithm Component Specification checks the possibility of adding a high atomicity recovery action to each state of S rec , its complexity is polynomial in the number of states of S rec .
Token Ring Example Continued
We trace the algorithm of Figure 2 for the case of token ring program. First, we non-deterministically identify P S 0 as the process that can read every program variable and can add a high atomicity recovery transition from the deadlock state s d = ⊥, ⊥, ⊥, ⊥ . Thus, the value of index will be equal to 0. Second, we construct the detection predicate X, where X ≡ ((x 0 = ⊥) ∧ (x 1 = ⊥) ∧ (x 2 = ⊥) ∧ (x 3 = ⊥)). Finally, using the read/write restrictions of the processes in the token ring program, the relation R will be equal to { 0, 1 , 1, 2 , 2, 3 , 3, 0 }.
Algorithmic Addition of The Fault-Tolerance Components
In this section, we present an algorithm for adding a fault-tolerance component to a fault-intolerant distributed program to resolve a deadlock state s d . Before the addition, we ensure that no interference exists between the program and the fault-tolerance component; i.e., the execution of one of them does not violate the (safety or liveness) specification of the other one. We show that our addition algorithm is sound; i.e., the synthesized program satisfies the requirement of the addition problem (cf. Section 3).
We represent the transitions of p by the union of its groups of transitions (i.e., ∪ m i=0 g i ). We also assume that we have extracted the required pre-synthesized component, c, as described in Section 6.1. The component c consists of a detector d that includes a set of transition groups ∪ k i=0 gd i , and the write action of the pseudo process P S index represented by a group of transitions g index in the low atomicity.
The state space of the composition of p and d is the new state space S p . We introduce an onto function 
The transitions of p do not interfere with the liveness of d because d need not execute when p is not in the deadlock state s d . Thus, p does not affect the liveness of d. Hence, we are only concerned with the safety of the detector d and the closure of U . When we map the transitions of p to the new state space, the mapped transitions should preserve the safety of d. Moreover, if the image of a transition (s 0 , s 1 ) starts in U (i.e., H 2 (s 0 ) ∈ U ) then the image of (s 0 , s 1 ) will have to end in U (i.e., H 2 (s 1 ) ∈ U ). The emptiness of I 1 shows that the transitions of p do not interfere with the execution of d.
Likewise, we construct the set of groups of transitions I 2 and I 3 in the new state space S p to verify the second and the third conditions of interferencefreedom. Since I 2 and I 3 are structurally similar to I 1 , we skip their presentation (cf. [13] for details). Thus, if I 1 , I 2 , and I 3 are empty then we declare that no interference will happen due to the addition of c to p.
Addition. We present the Add Component algorithm for an interference-free addition of the fault-tolerance component c to p. In the new state space S p , we construct a set of transition groups p H1 (respectively, d H2 ) that includes all groups of transitions, g, whose images in S p (respectively, S d ) belong to p (respectively, d). Besides, no transition of (s 0 , s 1 ) ∈ g violates the safety specification of d (respectively, p) or the closure of the invariant of d (respectively, p), i.e., U (respectively, S). Note that in the set d H2 , the image of every group g in d and p must belong to the same process.
Add Component(S, S rec , U : state predicate, H 1 , H 2 : onto mapping function, spec, spec d : safety specification, The set p c includes all groups of transitions, g, whose every transition has an image in g index under the mapping H 2 . Further, no transition (s 0 , s 1 ) ∈ g violates the safety of spec or the closure of S.
The set of states of the invariant of the synthesized program, S , consists of those states whose images in S p belong to the program invariant S and whose images in the state space of the detector, S d , belong to the detector invariant U . Theorem 6.1 The algorithm Add Component is sound. (cf. [13] for proof.) Theorem 6.2 The complexity of Add Component is polynomial in S p . (cf. [13] for proof.)
Token Ring Example Continued
Using Add Component, we add the detector specified in Section 6.2 to the token ring program M T R introduced in Section 4.2. The resulting program, consisting of the processes P 0 · · · P 3 arranged in a ring, is masking fault-tolerant to processrestart faults. We represent the transitions of P 0 by the following actions. The actions M T R 0 and M T R 0 are the same as the actions of the M T R program presented in Section 4.2. The action D 0 belongs to the sequential detector that sets the witness predicate Z 0 to true. The action C 0 is the recovery action that P 0 executes whenever the witness predicate (y 0 = true) becomes true. Now, we present the actions of P 3 . The action D 3 belongs to the detector d 3 that sets Z 3 to true. We represent the transitions of P 1 and P 2 as the following parameterized actions (for i = 1, 2).
The above program is masking fault-tolerant for the faults that corrupt one or more processes. Note that when a process P i (1 ≤ i ≤ 3) changes the value of x i to a non-corrupted value, it falsifies Z i (i.e., y i ). The falsification of Z i is important during the recovery from s d = ⊥, ⊥, ⊥, ⊥ in that when x i takes a non-corrupted value, the detection predicate X i no longer holds. Thus, if Z i remains true then the detector d i witnesses incorrectly, and as a result, violates the safety of the detector. However, P 0 does not need to falsify its witness predicate Z 0 in actions M T R 0 and M T R 0 because the action C 0 has already falsified Z 0 during a recovery from s d .
Discussion
In this section, we address some of the questions raised by our synthesis method. Specifically, we discuss the following issues: the model of faults considered in this paper, the fault-tolerance of the components, the choice of detectors and correctors, and pre-synthesized components with non-linear topologies. Does the fault model used in this paper enable us to capture different types of faults?
Yes. The notion of state perturbation is general enough to model different types of faults (namely, stuck-at, crash, fail-stop, omission, timing, or Byzantine) with different natures (intermittent, transient, and permanent faults). As an illustration, we modeled the process-restart faults that affect the token ring program, presented in this paper, by state perturbation. This model has also been used in designing fault-tolerance to (i) fail-stop, omission faults (e.g., [9] ), (ii) transient faults and improper initialization (e.g., [16] ), and (iii) input corruption (e.g., [9] ). Can the synthesis method deal with the faults that affect the fault-tolerance components?
Yes. The added component may itself be perturbed by the fault to which fault-tolerance is added. Hence, the added component must itself be fault-tolerant. For example, in our token ring program, we modeled the effect of the process restart on the added component and ensured that the component is fault-tolerant to that fault (cf. Theorem 5.1). For the fault-classes that are commonly used, e.g., process failure, process restart, input corruption, Byzantine faults, such modeling is always possible. For arbitrary fault-classes, however, some validation may be required to ensure that the modeling is appropriate for that fault.
How does the choice of detectors and correctors help in the synthesis of faulttolerant programs?
While there are several approaches (e.g., [17] ) that manually transform a fault-intolerant program into a fault-tolerant program, we use detectors and correctors in this paper, based on their necessity and sufficiency for manual addition of fault-tolerance [5] . The authors of [5] have also shown that detectors and correctors are abstract enough to generalize other components (e.g., comparators and voters used in replication-based approaches) for the design of fault-tolerant programs. Hence, we expect that the synthesis method in this paper can benefit from the generality of detectors and correctors in the automated synthesis of fault-tolerant programs as there is a potential to provide a rich library of faulttolerance components. Moreover, pre-synthesized detectors provide the kind of abstraction by which we can integrate efficient existing detections approaches (e.g., [18, 19] ) in pre-synthesized fault-tolerance components. Does the synthesis method support pre-synthesized components with non-linear topologies?
Yes. Using the synthesis method of this paper, we have added presynthesized components with tree-like structure to a diffusing computation program [7] where we synthesize a program that is fault-tolerant to the faults that perturb the state of the diffusing computation and the program topology.
Conclusion and Future Work
In this paper, we identified an approach for the synthesis of fault-tolerant programs from their fault-intolerant versions using pre-synthesized fault-tolerance components. Our approach differs from the synthesis method presented in [20] where one has to synthesize a fault-tolerant program from its temporal logic specification. Specifically, we demonstrated a hybrid synthesis method that combines heuristics presented in [2] [3] [4] with pre-synthesized detectors and correctors. We presented a sound algorithm for automatic specification and addition of pre-synthesized detectors/correctors to a distributed program. We showed how one could verify the interference-freedom of the fault-intolerant program and the added components. Using our synthesis algorithm, we showed how masking fault-tolerance is added to a token-ring program where all processes may be corrupted. By contrast, the previous synthesis algorithms fail to synthesize a fault-tolerant program when all processes are corrupted.
We also extended the problem of adding fault-tolerance to the case where new variables can be introduced while synthesizing fault-tolerant programs. By contrast, previous algorithms required that the state space of the fault-tolerant program is the same as that of the fault-intolerant program. Moreover, our synthesis method controls the way new variables are introduced; new variables are determined based on the added components. Hence, the synthesis method controls the way in which the state space is expanded.
